On What Matterstxt,chm,pdf,epub,mobi下载 作者:Derek Parfit 出版社: Oxford University Press 副标题: Volume Three 出版年: 2016-11-29 页数: 360 定价: USD 45.00 装帧: Hardcover ISBN: 9780198778608
内容简介 · · · · · ·Derek Parfit presents the third volume of On What Matters, his landmark work of moral philosophy. Parfit develops further his influential treatment of reasons, normativity, the meaning of moral discourse, and the status of morality. He engages with his critics, and shows the way to resolution of their differences. This volume is partly about what it is for things to matter, in ...
Derek Parfit presents the third volume of On What Matters, his landmark work of moral philosophy. Parfit develops further his influential treatment of reasons, normativity, the meaning of moral discourse, and the status of morality. He engages with his critics, and shows the way to resolution of their differences. This volume is partly about what it is for things to matter, in the sense that we all have reasons to care about these things. Much of the book discusses three of the main kinds of meta-ethical theory: Normative Naturalism, Quasi-Realist Expressivism, and Non-Metaphysical Non-Naturalism, which Derek Parfit now calls Non-Realist Cognitivism. This third theory claims that, if we use the word 'reality' in an ontologically weighty sense, irreducibly normative truths have no mysterious or incredible ontological implications. If instead we use 'reality' in a wide sense, according to which all truths are truths about reality, this theory claims that some non-empirically discoverable truths-such as logical, mathematical, modal, and some normative truths-raise no difficult ontological questions. Parfit discusses these theories partly by commenting on the views of some of the contributors to Peter Singer's collection Does Anything Really Matter? Parfit on Objectivity. Though Peter Railton is a Naturalist, he has widened his view by accepting some further claims, and he has suggested that this wider version of Naturalism could be combined with Non-Realist Cognitivism. Parfit argues that Railton is right, since these theories no longer deeply disagree. Though Allan Gibbard is a Quasi-Realist Expressivist, he has suggested that the best version of his view could be combined with Non-Realist Cognitivism. Parfit argues that Gibbard is right, since Gibbard and he now accept the other's main meta-ethical claim. It is rare for three such different philosophical theories to be able to be widened in ways that resolve their deepest disagreements. This happy convergence supports the view that these meta-ethical theories are true. Parfit also discusses the views of several other philosophers, and some other meta-ethical and normative questions.
作者简介 · · · · · ·Derek Parfit is one of the leading philosophers of our time. He is a Senior Research Fellow at All Souls College, Oxford, Global Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at New York University, and a Fellow of the British Academy and of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He is the author of Reasons and Persons (OUP, 1984), one of the most influential books in philosophy of...
Derek Parfit is one of the leading philosophers of our time. He is a Senior Research Fellow at All Souls College, Oxford, Global Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at New York University, and a Fellow of the British Academy and of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He is the author of Reasons and Persons (OUP, 1984), one of the most influential books in philosophy of the last several decades, and the acclaimed On What Matters: Volume One and Volume Two.
目录 · · · · · ·Preface Summary Part Seven: Irreducibly Normative Truths 37: How Things Might Matter 38: Normative and Natural Truths 39: Gibbard's Offer to Non-Naturalists · · · · · ·() Preface Summary Part Seven: Irreducibly Normative Truths 37: How Things Might Matter 38: Normative and Natural Truths 39: Gibbard's Offer to Non-Naturalists 40: Railton's Defence of Soft Naturalism 41: Railton's Resolution of our Disagreements 42: Jackson's Non-Empirical Normative Truths 43: Schroeder's Conservative Reductive Thesis Part Eight: Expressivist Truths 44: Quasi-Realist Expressivism 45: Gibbard's Resolution of our Disagreements 46: Another Triple Theory Part Nine: Normative and Psychological Reasons 47: Expressivist Reasons 48: Subjectivist Reasons 49: Street's Meta-Ethical Constructivism 50: Morality, Blame, and Internal Reasons 51: Nietzsche's Mountain 52: What Matters and Universal Reasons 53: Act Consequentialism, Reasons, and Morality · · · · · · ()
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内容的话,谈到了很多方面
超喜欢 包装好看
后来理论的东西很多
急躁不得!