What is law? What is it for? How should judges decide novel cases when the statutes and earlier decisions provide no clear answer? Do judges make up new law in such cases, or is there some higher law in which they discover the correct answer? Must everyone always obey the law? If not, when is a citizen morally free to disobey? A renowned philosopher enters the debate surrounding these questions. Clearly and forcefully, Ronald Dworkin argues against the "ruling" theory in Anglo-American law--legal positivism and economic utilitarianism--and asserts that individuals have legal rights beyond those explicitly laid down and that they have political and moral rights against the state that are prior to the welfare of the majority. Mr. Dworkin criticizes in detail the legal positivists' theory of legal rights, particularly H.L.A. Hart's well-known version of it. He then develops a new theory of adjudication, and applies it to the central and politically important issue of cases in which the Supreme Court interprets and applies the Constitution. Through an analysis of John Rawls's theory of justice, he argues that fundamental among political rights is the right of each individual to the equal respect and concern of those who govern him. He offers a theory of compliance with the law designed not simply to answer theoretical questions about civil disobedience, but to function as a guide for citizens and officials. Finally, Professor Dworkin considers the right to liberty, often thought to rival and even pre-empt the fundamental right to equality. He argues that distinct individual liberties do exist, but that they derive, not from some abstract right to liberty as such, but from the right to equal concern and respect itself. He thus denies that liberty and equality are conflicting ideals. Ronald Dworkin's theory of law and the moral conception of individual rights that underlies it have already made him one of the most influential philosophers working in this area. This is the first publication of these ideas in book form.

罗纳德·德沃金（Ronald．Myles．Dworkin , 1931—— ）

德沃金是当代最著名、最活跃的法理学家之一。德沃金出生于美国马萨诸塞州,先后在哈佛学院、牛津大学和哈佛大学获得学士学位,在耶鲁大学获得硕士学位。他起初的兴趣是哲学,但在牛津时开始学习法学,从此发现了自己的真正兴趣所在,随后进入哈佛大学法学院,1957年毕业后进入美国最高法院,任法官汉德（Learned Hand）的办事员,以后又当过律师。1962年成为耶鲁大学教授,1969年他应邀担任英国牛津大学法理学首席教授,直到1998年。1975年开始同时担任纽约大学法学的教授至今,他还不定期地担任过哈佛大学、康奈尔大学、普林斯顿大学教授,1984年以来还是伦敦大学（大学学院）的客座教授。。2002年5月中旬应邀来我国清华大学、复旦大学和浙江大学作过讲演。

罗纳德·德沃金被公认为当代英美法学理论传统中最有影响的人物之一。总的来说,德沃金所展现的是一种由政治自由主义指导的法理学。他的每一部重要的著作都引起广泛的讨论,其中既有赞同者,亦有批判者。