Conceptstxt,chm,pdf,epub,mobi下载 作者:Jerry A. Fodor 出版社: Oxford University Press, USA 副标题: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong (Oxford Cognitive Science Series) 出版年: 1998-04-09 页数: 186 定价: USD 97.75 装帧: Hardcover ISBN: 9780198236375
内容简介 · · · · · ·Oxford Cognitive Science Series General Editors: Martin Davies, Wilde Reader in Mental Philosophy, University of Oxford, UK, James Higginbotham , Professor of General Linguistics, University of Oxford, UK, John O'Keefe, Professor of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College, London, UK, Christopher Peacocke, Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy, University of Oxford,...
Oxford Cognitive Science Series General Editors: Martin Davies, Wilde Reader in Mental Philosophy, University of Oxford, UK, James Higginbotham , Professor of General Linguistics, University of Oxford, UK, John O'Keefe, Professor of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College, London, UK, Christopher Peacocke, Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy, University of Oxford, UK, and Kim Plunkett, University Lecturer in Psychology, University of Oxford, UK The Oxford Cognitive Science series is a forum for the best contemporary work in this flourishing field, where various disciplines-cognitive psychology, philosophy, linguistics, cognitive neuroscience, and computational theory-join forces in the investigation of thought, awareness, understanding, and associated workings of the mind. Each book will represent an original contribution to its subject, but will be accessible beyond the ranks of specialists, so as to reach a broad interdisciplinary readership. The series will be carefully shaped and steered by the general editors, with the aim of representing the most important developments in the field and bringing together its constituent disciplines. About this book The renowned philosopher Jerry Fodor, who has been a leading figure in the study of the mind for more than twenty years, presents a strikingly original theory of the basic constituents of thought. He suggests that the heart of a cognitive science is its theory of concepts, and that cognitive scientists have gone badly wrong in many areas because their assumptions about concepts have been seriously mistaken. Fodor argues compellingly for an atomistic theory of concepts, deals out witty and pugnacious demolitions of the rival theories that have prevailed in recent years, and suggests that future work on human cognition should build upon new foundations. This lively, conversational, accessible book is the first volume in the Oxford Cognitive Science Series, where the best original work in this field will be presented to a broad readership. Concepts will fascinate anyone interested in contemporary work on mind and language. Cognitive science will never be the same again.
目录 · · · · · ·Abbreviations and typographical conventions xii 1 Philosophical Introduction: The Background Theory 1 2 Unphilosophical Introduction: What Concepts Have To Be 23 3 The Demise of Definitions, Part I: The Linguist’s Tale 40 4 The Demise of Definitions, Part II: The Philosopher’s Tale 69 5 Prototypes and Compositionality 88 · · · · · ·() Abbreviations and typographical conventions xii 1 Philosophical Introduction: The Background Theory 1 2 Unphilosophical Introduction: What Concepts Have To Be 23 3 The Demise of Definitions, Part I: The Linguist’s Tale 40 4 The Demise of Definitions, Part II: The Philosopher’s Tale 69 5 Prototypes and Compositionality 88 Appendix 5A: Meaning Postulates 108 Appendix 5B: The ‘Theory Theory’ of Concepts 112 6 Innateness and Ontology, Part I: The Standard Argument 120 Appendix 6A: Similarity 144 7 Innateness and Ontology, Part II: Natural Kind Concepts 146 Appendix 7A: Round Squares 163 Bibliography 167 Author index 173 · · · · · · ()
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品质不错值得拜看
很期待
文字表现力极强
这本书真的还是很有参考价值的。